498A

decided on 17.10.2012
Supreme Court of India.

Case No:
Criminal Appeal No. 1674 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10547/2010)

Coram:
2 Judge Bench of:
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE T.S. THAKUR
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE GYAN SUDHA MISRA

Issue:
Can the court quash proceedings against family members of the accused in a matrimonial dispute based on a casual reference in the FIR without specific allegations of their involvement?

Fact:

The case in question is Geeta Mehrotra and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. It involves an appeal before the Supreme Court against an order of the High Court regarding the quashing of proceedings initiated against the appellants under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The appellants were the family members of the accused in a matrimonial dispute, and their names were casually referenced in the FIR without specific allegations of their involvement. The Court held that mere casual reference of family members in a matrimonial dispute without allegations of active involvement does not justify taking cognizance against them, and it would be an abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send them to undergo the trial unless the FIR discloses specific allegations that persuade the Court to take cognizance of the offence.

Held

23. In the instant case, the question of territorial jurisdiction was just one of the grounds for quashing the proceedings along with the other grounds and, therefore, the High Court should have examined whether the prosecution case was fit to be quashed on other grounds or not. At this stage, the question also crops up whether the matter is fit to be remanded to the High Court to consider all these aspects. But in matters arising out of a criminal case, fresh consideration by remanding the same would further result into a protracted and vexatious proceeding which is unwarranted as was held by this Court in the case of Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) that such a course of remand would be unnecessary and inexpedient as there was no need to prolong the controversy. The facts in this matter on this aspect was although somewhat different since the complainant had lodged the complaint after seven years of delay, yet in the instant matter the factual position remains that the complaint as it stands lacks ingredients constituting the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act against the Appellants who are sister and brother of the complainant’s husband and their involvement in the whole incident appears only by way of a casual inclusion of their names. Hence, it cannot be overlooked that it would be total abuse of the process of law if we were to remand the matter to the High Court to consider whether there were still any material to hold that the trial should proceed against them in spite of absence of prima facie material constituting the offence alleged against them.
24. However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that even if there are allegation of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasize by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses specific allegations which would persuade the court to take cognisance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the complainant-wife. It is the well settled principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of the process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing specially in cases of matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of over-implication by involving the entire family of the accused at the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.
25. In the case at hand, when the brother and unmarried sister of the principal accused Shyamji Mehrotra approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings against them, inter-alia, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as also on the ground that no case was made out against them under Sections 498A,/323/504/506 including Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, it was the legal duty of the High Court to examine whether there were prima facie material against the Appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the trial, besides the question of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court seems to have overlooked all the pleas that were raised and rejected the petition on the solitary ground of territorial jurisdiction giving liberty to the Appellants to approach the trial court.
26. The High Court in our considered opinion appear to have missed that assuming the trial court had territorial jurisdiction, it was still left to be decided whether it was a fit case to send the Appellants for trial when the FIR failed to make out a prima facie case against them regarding the allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant demanding dowry from the complainant. Since the High Court has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court as already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter to the High Court to consider whether a case was made out against the Appellants to proceed against them. But as the contents of the FIR does not disclose specific allegation against the brother and sister of the complainant’s husband except casual reference of their names, it would not be just to direct them to go through protracted procedure by remanding for consideration of the matter all over again by the High Court and make the unmarried sister of the main accused and his elder brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against them specially when the FIR does not disclose ingredients of offence under Sections 498A/323/504/506, Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
27. We, therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against the Appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any material which could be held to be constituting any offence against these two Appellants. Merely by making a general allegation that they were also involved in the physical and mental torture of the complainant-Respondent No. 2 without mentioning even a single incident against them as also the fact as to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only related as brother and sister of the complainant’s husband, we are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings in so far as these Appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. The appeal accordingly is allowed.

The Supreme Court of India in which the court quashed the criminal proceedings against the brother and unmarried sister of the husband of the complainant, Geeta Mehrotra. The court held that there was no specific allegation against them in the FIR, which could constitute the offence of physical and mental torture under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The court observed that in cases of matrimonial disputes, it is important to examine whether the FIR discloses a specific allegation against the accused, and not to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR for trial. The court also emphasized that while allegations of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR could justify cognizance, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegations against accused, it would be a clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial. The court also observed that courts should adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing, especially in cases of matrimonial disputes. The court held that the High Court had erred in overlooking the pleas raised by the appellants and rejecting the petition on the solitary ground of territorial jurisdiction, and not examining whether there was prima facie material against the appellants to proceed against them. Finally, the court quashed the proceedings initiated against the appellants as the FIR did not disclose any material which could constitute an offence against them.

decided on 02.07.2014 Supreme Court of India.

Case No:
Criminal Appeal No. 1277 of 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)
No. 9127 of 2013)

Coram:
2 Judge Bench of:
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE C.K. PRASAD
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE

Issue:
Whether the casual manner in which accused in cases under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are arrested and remanded to

judicial custody can be addressed through specific directions to police officers and magistrates.

Fact:

The petitioner in this case was apprehending arrest in a case under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The petitioner had moved for anticipatory bail, which was rejected. The petitioner then approached the Supreme Court seeking anticipatory bail.
The Supreme Court expressed concern at the casual manner in which the husband and his relatives are usually named as accused in cases under Section 498A and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, and also at the casual manner in which accused in such cases are arrested and remanded to judicial custody. The court issued a series of directions to ensure that the police and magistrates are more circumspect in arresting the accused without a warrant and in committing them to judicial custody.

Held

3. Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not arrest the accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise detention casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we have observed above, we give the following direction:

(1) All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case Under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41, Code of Criminal Procedure;

(2) All police officers be provided with a checklist containing specified sub-clauses Under
Section 41(1)(b)(ii);

(3) The police officer shall forward the checklist duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;

(4) The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;

(5) The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

(6) Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

(7) Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

(8) Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.

14. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the cases Under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years; whether with or without fine.

The court held that police officers should not arrest accused individuals unnecessarily and magistrates should not authorize detention casually or mechanically. To ensure this, the court issued several directions, including instructing state governments to have police officers satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, providing police officers with a checklist, and requiring magistrates to peruse reports furnished by police officers and record their satisfaction before authorizing detention. The court also stated that failure to comply with these directions could result in departmental action or punishment for contempt of court. Additionally, the court clarified that these directions apply not only to cases under certain sections of the Indian Penal Code and Dowry Prohibition Act but also to cases where the offense is punishable with imprisonment for a term less than or equal to seven years.

decided on 27.07.2017
Supreme Court of India.

Case No:
Criminal Appeal No. 1265 of 2017 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)
No. 2013 of 2017)

Coram:
2 Judge Bench of:
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ADARSH KUMAR GOEL
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE U.U. LALIT

Issue:

Whether the involvement of civil society and constitution of Family Welfare Committees can aid in the administration of justice in cases related to Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code?

Fact:

The Trial Court found the Appellant guilty of torturing the Respondent and committing an offence under Section 323, 498A of the Indian Penal Code and read with Section 3, 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. A summon was issued against the Appellant, and the Respondent filed a revision petition to summon other Appellants. The Trial Court passed an order in favour of the Respondent, and the High Court found no grounds to interfere with the order of summoning and dismissed the petition. The Appellant has now filed the present appeal challenging the decision.

Held

19. Thus, after careful consideration of the whole issue, we consider it fit to give following directions:

i) (a) In every district one or more Family Welfare Committees be constituted by the District Legal Services Authorities preferably comprising of three members. The constitution and working of such committees may be reviewed from time to time and at least once in a year by the District and Sessions Judge of the district who is also the Chairman of the District Legal Services Authority.

(b) The Committees may be constituted out of para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/wives of working officers/other citizens who may be found suitable and willing.

(c) The Committee members will not be called as witnesses.

(d) Every complaint Under Section 498A received by the police or the Magistrate be referred to and looked into by such committee. Such committee may have interaction with the parties personally or by means of telephone or any other mode of communication including electronic communication.

(e) Report of such committee be given to the Authority by whom the complaint is referred to it latest within one month from the date of receipt of complaint.

(f) The committee may give its brief report about the factual aspects and its opinion in the matter.

(g) Till report of the committee is received, no arrest should normally be effected.

(h) The report may be then considered by the Investigating Officer or the Magistrate on its own merit.

(i) Members of the committee may be given such basic minimum training as may be considered necessary by the Legal Services Authority from time to time.

(j) The Members of the committee may be given such honorarium as may be considered viable.

(k) It will be open to the District and Sessions Judge to utilize the cost fund wherever considered necessary and proper.

ii) Complaints Under Section 498A and other connected offences may be investigated only by a designated Investigating Officer of the area. Such designations may be made within one month from today. Such designated officer may be required to undergo training for such duration (not less than one week) as may be considered appropriate. The training may be completed within four months from today;

iii) In cases where a settlement is reached, it will be open to the District and Sessions Judge or any other senior Judicial Officer nominated by him in the district to dispose of the proceedings including closing of the criminal case if dispute primarily relates to matrimonial discord;

iv) If a bail application is filed with at least one clear day’s notice to the Public Prosecutor/complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife/minor children can otherwise be protected. Needless to say that in dealing with bail matters, individual roles, prima facie truth of the allegations, requirement of further arrest/custody and interest of justice must be carefully weighed;

v) In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red Corner Notice should not be a routine;

vi) It will be open to the District Judge or a designated senior judicial officer nominated by the District Judge to club all connected cases between the parties arising out of matrimonial disputes so that a holistic view is taken by the Court to whom all such cases are entrusted; and

vii) Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be required and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting progress of the trial.

viii) These directions will not apply to the offences involving tangible physical injuries or death.

In this case, the Supreme Court gave certain directions to prevent the misuse of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with the offence of cruelty by a husband or his relatives towards a woman. The court acknowledged that while the provision has been enacted to protect women from cruelty, it has also been misused to harass innocent people. Therefore, the court directed the formation of Family Welfare Committees in every district to review complaints under Section 498A before any arrest is made. The court also directed that complaints under Section 498A and related offences should be investigated only by a designated officer who has received training, and that recovery of disputed dowry items should not be a ground for denial of bail. The court also allowed for exemption from personal appearance or appearance by video conferencing for family members, particularly those who reside out of station. These directions were not to apply to offences involving tangible physical injuries or death.

decided on 19.07.2005 Supreme Court of India.

Case No:
Writ Petition (civil) 141 of 2005

Coram:
2 Judge Bench of:
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE H.K. SEMA

Issue:

Whether Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with the offence of subjecting a woman to cruelty by her husband or his relatives, is ultra vires the Constitution of India and whether the mere possibility of abuse of the provision of law renders it objectionable, ultra vires or unconstitutional?

Fact

The case dealt with a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with the offence of cruelty by a husband or his relatives towards a woman. The petitioners contended that the provision was being misused and had become a tool in the hands of disgruntled wives to harass and intimidate their husbands and their relatives. They argued that the provision violated the fundamental rights of the accused and was ultra vires the Constitution.

The Supreme Court rejected these contentions and upheld the validity of Section 498A. The Court held that the provision was a necessary measure to address the social evil of dowry and protect the rights of married women. However, the Court also acknowledged that there was a possibility of abuse of the provision and that it was for the legislature to consider appropriate measures to prevent such misuse.
The Court also emphasized that the provision was not intended to be misused as a tool of harassment and that frivolous complaints or allegations should be appropriately dealt with. The Court observed that the provision was intended to be a shield for women, not an assassin’s weapon.

Held

9. The object for which Section 498A IPC was introduced is amply reflected in the Statement of Objects and Reasons while enacting Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act No. 46 of 1983. As clearly stated therein the increase in number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to examine the work of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In some cases, cruelty of the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by or murder of the helpless woman concerned, which constitute only a small fraction involving such cruelty. Therefore, it was proposed to amend IPC, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) and the Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of dowry deaths but also cases of cruelty to married women by the husband, in-law and relatives. The avowed object is to combat the menace of dowry death and cruelty.

10. One other provision which is relevant to be noted is Section 306 IPC. The basic difference between the two Sections i.e. Section 306 and Section 498A is that of intention. Under the latter, cruelty committed by the husband or his relations drag the women concerned to commit suicide, while under the former provision suicide is abetted and intended.

…

12. In Budhan Choudhry and Ors. v. State of Bihar a contention was raised that a provision of law may not be discriminatory but it may land itself to abuse bringing about discrimination between the persons similarly situated. This court repelled the contention holding that on the possibility of abuse of a provision by the authority, the legislation may not be held arbitrary or discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
13. From the decided cases in India as well as in United States of America, the principle appears to be well settled that if a statutory provision is otherwise intra-vires, constitutional and valid, mere possibility of abuse of power in a given case would not make it objectionable, ultra-vires or unconstitutional. In such cases, “action” and not the “section” may be vulnerable. If it is so, the court by upholding the provision of law, may still set aside the action, order or decision and grant appropriate relief to the person aggrieved.

…

17. Above being the position we find no substance in the plea that Section 498A has no legal or constitutional foundation.
18. The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contented by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bonafide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the anomy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the existing frame work. As noted above the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used a shield and not an assassin’s weapon. If cry of “wolf” is made too often as a prank assistance and protection may not be available when the actual “wolf” appears. There is no question of investigating agency and Courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any pre-conceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumptions that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide available and generalized statement. Certain statutory presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of watch dog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that an innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally undisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.

In this case, the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutional validity of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with cruelty to married women by their husbands or their relatives. The court observed that the object of the provision is to prevent the dowry menace, which is a matter of serious concern. The court also noted that the provision is not intended to be misused as a shield to wreck personal vendettas or unleash harassment. However, the court acknowledged that there have been instances where complaints under this provision have been filed with oblique motives, and that the acquittal of the accused does not always wipe out the harm suffered during and prior to trial. The court emphasized that there is a need for remedial measures to prevent abuse of the provision, and suggested that the legislature find ways to appropriately deal with the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations.

The court also stated that the investigating agencies and courts should act as watch dogs, and not as bloodhounds, to ensure that innocent people are not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless, and malicious allegations. The court held that here is no scope for any pre-conceived notion or view, and that the ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at the truth, punish the guilty, and protect the innocent.

decided on 08.02.2022  Supreme Court of India.

Case No:
Criminal Appeal No. 195 of 2022 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6545 of 2020) Coram:
2 Judge Bench of:
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE KRISHNA MURARI,
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE, S. ABDUL NAZEER

Issue:

Whether the general and omnibus allegations made in an FIR against the in-laws,without specific roles attributed to them, warrant prosecution under Section 341, 323, 379, 354, 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code?

Fact

The case involves a complaint by a woman against her husband and his relatives alleging demand for dowry and harassment. The court took cognizance of the offence against the husband under Section 498A and issued the summons. The dispute was resolved, and the woman returned to her matrimonial home. Later, she gave another complaint against her husband and his relatives for pressurizing her to purchase a car as a dowry and threatening to forcibly terminate her pregnancy if the demands were not met. The husband and his relatives sought quashing of the FIR, which was dismissed by the court. The case reached the appellate court, which found that the allegations against the relatives were general and omnibus, without any specific role attributed to them, and quashed the FIR against them. The court expressed concern over the misuse of Section 498A and the tendency to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes without considering the long-term consequences of a trial on both parties.

Held

19. Coming to the facts of this case, upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR dated 01.04.19, it is revealed that general allegations are levelled against the Appellants. The complainant alleged that ‘all Accused harassed her mentally and threatened her of terminating her pregnancy’. Furthermore, no specific and distinct allegations have been made against either of the Appellants herein, i.e., none of the Appellants have been attributed any specific role in furtherance of the general allegations made against them. This simply leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each Accused in furtherance of the offence. The allegations are therefore general and omnibus and can at best be said to have been made out on account of small skirmishes. Insofar as husband is concerned, since he has not appealed against the order of the High court, we have not examined the veracity of allegations made against him. However, as far as the Appellants are concerned, the allegations made against them being general and omnibus, do not warrant prosecution.
20. Furthermore, regarding similar allegations of harassment and demand for car as dowry made in a previous FIR. Respondent No. 1 i.e., the State of Bihar, contends that the present FIR pertained to offences committed in the year 2019, after assurance was given by the husband Md. Ikram before the Ld. Principal Judge Purnea, to not harass the Respondent’s wife herein for dowry, and treat her properly. However, despite the assurances, all Accused continued their demands and harassment. It is thereby contended that the acts constitute a fresh cause of action and therefore the FIR in question herein dated 01.04.19, is distinct and independent, and cannot be termed as a repetition of an earlier FIR dated 11.12.17.
21. Here it must be borne in mind that although the two FIRs may constitute two independent instances, based on separate transactions, the present complaint fails to establish specific allegations against the in-laws of the Respondent’s wife. Allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws Appellants would simply result in an abuse of the process of law.
22. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the Accused Appellants, it would be unjust if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e., general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant’s husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this Court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the Accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.
23. In view of the above facts and discussions, the impugned order dated 13.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Patna is set aside. The impugned F.I.R. No. 248 of 2019 against the Appellants Under Sections 341, 323, 379, 354, 498A read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code stands quashed.

In this case, the Court allowed the appeal of the accused, who were the in-laws of the complainant’s husband. The complainant had lodged an FIR against the accused, alleging that they had harassed her mentally and threatened to terminate her pregnancy if she did not purchase a car as a dowry. The Court observed that the allegations against the accused were general and omnibus, with no specific role attributed to them. The Court further noted that a previous FIR had been lodged with similar allegations, but failed to establish specific allegations against the in-laws. The Court held that allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the accused would result in an abuse of the process of law, and quashed the FIR against the accused. The Court emphasized that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.

decided on 12.11.2013 Supreme Court of India.

Case No:

Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 68 of 2008, Contempt Petition (C) No. D26722 of 2008 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 68 of 2008, S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 5986 of 2006, S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 5200 of 2009, Criminal Appeal No. 1410 of 2011 and Criminal Appeal No. 1267 of 2007 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)

Coram:
5 Judge Bench of:
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE P. SATHASIVAM, C.J.I.
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE B.S. CHAUHAN
HON’BLE MRS JUSTICE RANJANA PRAKASH
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE S.A. BOBDE

Issue:

Whether the mandatory registration of FIR under Section 154 of the Code, in cases where the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, can be avoided by conducting a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not, and what are the circumstances under which a preliminary inquiry can be conducted?

Fact

The writ petition was filed by Lalita Kumari’s father, Bhola Kamat, under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus or direction(s) of like nature against the Respondent for the protection of his minor daughter who has been kidnapped. The petitioner had submitted a written report to the officer in charge of the police station concerned on 11.05.2008, but no action was taken on the same. Later, when the Superintendent of Police was approached, an FIR was registered. However, even after that, no steps were taken to apprehend the accused or recover the minor girl child. The case involved the interpretation of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which deals with the recording of the First Information Report (FIR) by the police in cognizable offences.

Held 
111 In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:

(i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.

(ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

(iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.

(iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.

(v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.

(vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes

(b) Commercial offences

(c) Medical negligence cases

(d) Corruption cases

(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.

The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.

(vii) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case it should not exceed fifteen days generally and in exceptional cases, by giving adequate reasons, six weeks time is provided. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.

(viii) Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.

The court held that registration of First Information Report (FIR) is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), if the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether the cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence. The court provided illustrations of cases where preliminary inquiry may be made, such as matrimonial disputes, family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases, and cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution. However, the list of cases is not exhaustive.

The court also directed that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in the registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary of the police station, and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected in the Diary. The court emphasized that the police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering an offence if a cognizable offence is disclosed and action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.

decided on 30.04.1997  Supreme Court of India.

Case No:

Criminal Appeal No. 46 with 47 of 1991

Coram:

2 Judge Bench of:
HON’BLE  MRS JUSTICE G.T. NANAVATI
HON’BLE  MR JUSTICE G.N. RAY

Issue:

Did the court have jurisdiction to hear a case against the respondents for crimes under Sections 498A, 506B, and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, based on the complaint filed by the appellant, considering the territorial jurisdiction under Section 178 of the Criminal Procedure Code?

Fact

This is a legal case where the appellant, Sujata Mukherjee, had filed a complaint against her husband, parents-in-law, and two sisters-in-law alleging that she was being maltreated and humiliated on account of dowry demands. The respondents had filed criminal revision petitions in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, challenging the assumption of jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, in the complaint made by the appellant for offences under Section 498A, 506B, and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court held that except for the husband, the complaint against the other respondents related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh, and hence, the criminal case filed in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, was not maintainable against the said other respondents at Raipur. The appellant’s counsel argued that the complaint disclosed an offence committed partly in one local area and partly in another local area, and the offence was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas, and hence, the learned Magistrate at Raipur had jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted in such Court. The counsel for the State argued that Clause (b) of Section 178 was not attracted, but if the offence was a continuing one, Clause (c) of the Section 178 may be attracted. The court found that the complaint revealed a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused-respondents, and on some occasions, all the respondents had taken part, and on other occasions, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore, Clause (c) of Section 178 of the CrPC was applicable.

Held 

7…We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents and such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasions, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore, Clause (c) of Section 178 of the CrPC is clearly attracted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and directed the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to proceed with the criminal case. Since the matter is pending for long, steps should be taken to expedite the hearing. The appeals are accordingly allowed.

The Supreme Court set aside the previous order of the High Court and directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Raipur to proceed with the criminal case against the accused respondents, as the complaint filed by the appellant revealed a continuing offence under Sections 498A, 506B, and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. The court also directed that steps be taken to expedite the hearing, since the matter had been pending for long.

decided on 22.02.2013 Supreme Court of India.

Case No:

Civil Appeal No. 1794 of 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4782 of 2007)

Coram:

2 Judge Bench of:
HON’BLE  MR JUSTICE AFTAB ALAM
HON’BLE  MRS JUSTICE RANJANA PRAKASH

Issue:

Issue 1

Whether mental cruelty by one spouse can be a ground for divorce, and if so, whether permanent alimony can be awarded to the other spouse in cases where they are financially dependent on their partner.

Issue 2

Did the court have jurisdiction to hear a case against the respondents for crimes under Sections 498A, 506B, and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, based on the complaint filed by the appellant, considering the territorial jurisdiction under Section 178 of the Criminal Procedure Code?

Fact

This is a legal case where the appellant, Sujata Mukherjee, had filed a complaint against her husband, parents-in-law, and two sisters-in-law alleging that she was being maltreated and humiliated on account of dowry demands. The respondents had filed criminal revision petitions in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, challenging the assumption of jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, in the complaint made by the appellant for offences under Section 498A, 506B, and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court held that except for the husband, the complaint against the other respondents related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh, and hence, the criminal case filed in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, was not maintainable against the said other respondents at Raipur. The appellant’s counsel argued that the complaint disclosed an offence committed partly in one local area and partly in another local area, and the offence was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas, and hence, the learned Magistrate at Raipur had jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted in such Court. The counsel for the State argued that Clause (b) of Section 178 was not attracted, but if the offence was a continuing one, Clause (c) of Section 178 may be attracted. The court found that the complaint revealed a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents, and on some occasions, all the respondents had taken part, and on other occasions, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore, Clause (c) of Section 178 of the CrPC was applicable.

Held 

28. In the ultimate analysis, we hold that the Respondent-wife has caused by her conduct mental cruelty to the Appellant-husband and the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Dissolution of marriage will relieve both sides of pain and anguish. In this Court the Respondent-wife expressed that she wants to go back to the Appellant-husband, but, that is not possible now. The Appellant-husband is not willing to take her back. Even if we refuse decree of divorce to the Appellant-husband, there are hardly any chances of the Respondent-wife leading a happy life with the Appellant-husband because a lot of bitterness is created by the conduct of the Respondent-wife.
29. In Vijay Kumar, it was submitted that if the decree of divorce is set aside, there may be fresh avenues and scope for reconciliation between parties. This Court observed that judged in the background of all surrounding circumstances, the claim appeared to be too desolate, merely born out of despair rather than based upon any real, concrete or genuine purpose or aim. In the facts of this case we feel the same.
30. While we are of the opinion that decree of divorce must be granted, we are alive to the plight of the Respondent-wife. The Appellant-husband is working as an Assistant Registrar in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. He is getting a good salary. The Respondent-wife fought the litigation for more than 10 years. She appears to be entirely dependent on her parents and on her brother, therefore, her future must be secured by directing the Appellant-husband to give her permanent alimony. In the facts and circumstance of this case, we are of the opinion that the Appellant-husband should be directed to pay a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs only) to the Respondent-wife as and by way of permanent alimony. In the result, the impugned judgment is quashed and set aside. The marriage between the Appellant-husband – K. Srinivas Rao and the Respondent-wife – D.A. Deepa is dissolved by a decree of divorce. The Appellant-husband shall pay to the Respondent-wife permanent alimony in the sum of Rs. 15,00,000/-, in three instalments. The first instalment of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) should be paid on 15/03/2013 and the remaining amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) should be paid in instalments of Rs. 5,00,000/- each after a gap of two months i.e. on 15/05/2013 and 15/07/2013 respectively. Each instalment of Rs. 5,00,000/- be paid by a demand draft drawn in favour of the Respondent-wife “D.A. Deepa”.
31. Before parting, we wish to touch upon an issue which needs to be discussed in the interest of victims of matrimonial disputes. Though in this case, we have recorded a finding that by her conduct, the Respondent-wife has caused mental cruelty to the Appellant-husband, we may not be understood, however, to have said that the fault lies only with the Respondent-wife. In matrimonial disputes there is hardly any case where one spouse is entirely at fault. But, then, before the dispute assumes alarming proportions, someone must make efforts to make parties see reason. In this case, if at the earliest stage, before the Respondent-wife filed the complaint making indecent allegation against her mother-in-law, she were to be counseled by an independent and sensible elder or if the parties were sent to a mediation centre or if they had access to a pre-litigation clinic, perhaps the bitterness would not have escalated. Things would not have come to such a pass if, at the earliest, somebody had mediated between the two. It is possible that the Respondent-wife was desperate to save the marriage. Perhaps, in desperation, she lost balance and went on filing complaints. It is possible that she was misguided. Perhaps, the Appellant-husband should have forgiven her indiscretion in filing complaints in the larger interest of matrimony. But, the way the Respondent-wife approached the problem was wrong. It portrays a vindictive mind. She caused extreme mental cruelty to the Appellant-husband. Now the marriage is beyond repair.
32. Quite often, the cause of the misunderstanding in a matrimonial dispute is trivial and can be sorted. Mediation as a method of alternative dispute resolution has got legal recognition now. We have referred several matrimonial disputes to mediation centres. Our experience shows that about 10 to 15% of matrimonial disputes get settled in this Court through various mediation centres. We, therefore, feel that at the earliest stage i.e. when the dispute is taken up by the Family Court or by the court of first instance for hearing, it must be referred to mediation centres. Matrimonial disputes particularly those relating to custody of child, maintenance, etc. are preeminently fit for mediation. Section 9 of the Family Courts Act enjoins upon the Family Court to make efforts to settle the matrimonial disputes and in these efforts, Family Courts are assisted by Counsellors. Even if the Counsellors fail in their efforts, the Family Courts should direct the parties to mediation centres, where trained mediators are appointed to mediate between the parties. Being trained in the skill of mediation, they produce good results.
33. The idea of pre-litigation mediation is also catching up. Some mediation centres have, after giving wide publicity, set up “Help Desks” at prominent places including facilitation centres at court complexes to conduct pre-litigation mediation. We are informed that in Delhi Government Mediation and Conciliation Centres, and in Delhi High Court Mediation Centre, several matrimonial disputes are settled. These centres have a good success rate in pre-litigation mediation. If all mediation centres set up pre-litigation desks/clinics by giving sufficient publicity and matrimonial disputes are taken up for pre-litigation settlement, many families will be saved of hardship if, at least, some of them are settled.
34. While purely a civil matrimonial dispute can be amicably settled by a Family Court either by itself or by directing the parties to explore the possibility of settlement through mediation, a complaint under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code presents difficulty because the said offence is not compoundable except in the State of Andhra Pradesh where by a State amendment, it has been made compoundable. Though in Ramgopal and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. MANU/SC/0562/2010 : (2010) 13 SCC 540, this Court requested the Law Commission and the Government of India to examine whether offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code could be made compoundable, it has not been made compoundable as yet. The courts direct parties to approach mediation centres where offences are compoundable. Offence punishable under Section 498-A being a non-compoundable offence, such a course is not followed in respect thereof. This Court has always adopted a positive approach and encouraged settlement of matrimonial disputes and discouraged their escalation. In this connection, we must refer to the relevant paragraph from G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad and Ors. MANU/SC/3156/2000 : (2000) 3 SCC 693, where the complaint appeared to be the result of matrimonial dispute, while refusing to interfere with the High Court’s order quashing the complaint, this Court made very pertinent observations, which read thus:

12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counseled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.

    In B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr. MANU/SC/0230/2003 : AIR 2003 SC 1386, after referring to the above observations, this Court stated that the said observations are required to be kept in view by courts while dealing with matrimonial disputes and held that complaint involving offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code if the parties settle their dispute. Even in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr. MANU/SC/0781/2012 : (2012) 10 SCC 303, this Court expressed that certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour like those arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute and where the offender and the victim had settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if it feels that by not quashing the same, the ends of justice shall be defeated.

35. We, therefore, feel that though offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is not compoundable, in appropriate cases if the parties are willing and if it appears to the criminal court that there exist elements of settlement, it should direct the parties to explore the possibility of settlement through mediation. This is, obviously, not to dilute the rigour, efficacy and purport of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, but to locate cases where the matrimonial dispute can be nipped in bud in an equitable manner. The judges, with their expertise, must ensure that this exercise does not lead to the erring spouse using mediation process to get out of clutches of the law. During mediation, the parties can either decide to part company on mutually agreed terms or they may decide to patch up and stay together. In either case for the settlement to come through, the complaint will have to be quashed. In that event, they can approach the High Court and get the complaint quashed. If however they chose not to settle, they can proceed with the complaint. In this exercise, there is no loss to anyone. If there is settlement, the parties will be saved from the trials and tribulations of a criminal case and that will reduce the burden on the courts which will be in the larger public interest. Obviously, the High Court will quash the complaint only if after considering all circumstances it finds the settlement to be equitable and genuine. Such a course, in our opinion, will be beneficial to those who genuinely want to accord a quietus to their matrimonial disputes. We would, however, like to clarify that reduction of burden of cases on the courts will, however, be merely an incidental benefit and not the reason for sending the parties for mediation. We recognize ‘mediation’ as an effective method of alternative dispute resolution in matrimonial matters and that is the reason why we want the parties to explore the possibility of settlement through mediation in matrimonial disputes.
36. We, therefore, issue directions, which the courts dealing with the matrimonial matters shall follow:

(a) In terms of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Courts shall make all efforts to settle the matrimonial disputes through mediation. Even if the Counsellors submit a failure report, the Family Courts shall, with the consent of the parties, refer the matter to the mediation centre. In such a case, however, the Family Courts shall set a reasonable time limit for mediation centres to complete the process of mediation because otherwise the resolution of the disputes by the Family Court may get delayed. In a given case, if there is good chance of settlement, the Family Court in its discretion, can always extend the time limit.

(b) The criminal courts dealing with the complaint under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code should, at any stage and particularly, before they take up the complaint for hearing, refer the parties to mediation centre if they feel that there exist elements of settlement and both the parties are willing. However, they should take care to see that in this exercise, rigour, purport and efficacy of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is not diluted. Needless to say that the discretion to grant or not to grant bail is not in any way curtailed by this direction. It will be for the concerned court to work out the modalities taking into consideration the facts of each case.

(c) All mediation centres shall set up pre-litigation desks/clinics; give them wide publicity and make efforts to settle matrimonial disputes at the pre-litigation stage.

In this case, the court held that the respondent’s wife had caused mental cruelty to the appellant’s husband and the marriage had irretrievably broken down. Despite the respondent expressing a desire to reconcile, the court found that it was not possible due to the bitterness created by her conduct. The court granted a decree of divorce and directed the appellant’s husband to pay Rs. 15,00,000/- to the respondent’s wife as permanent alimony, to secure her future since she appears to be entirely dependent on her parents and brother. The amount was to be paid in three instalments, with the first instalment due on 15/03/2013 and the remaining two instalments due on 15/05/2013 and 15/07/2013, respectively, each paid by a demand draft drawn in favour of the respondent’s wife.

In this judgement, the Supreme Court of India held that in matrimonial disputes, there is hardly any case where one spouse is entirely at fault. The court suggested that at the earliest stage, before the dispute assumes alarming proportions, someone must make efforts to make parties see reason. The court recommended that matrimonial disputes should be referred to mediation centers at the earliest stage, and that pre-litigation mediation is catching up as an effective method of alternative dispute resolution. The court also discussed the difficulty of amicably settling a complaint under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, which presents difficulty because the said offence is not compoundable except in the State of Andhra Pradesh where by a State amendment, it has been made compoundable. The court encouraged the settlement of matrimonial disputes and discouraged their escalation.

decided on 22.11.2016  Supreme Court of India.

Case No:

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1138-1139 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 5928-5929 of 2016)

Coram:

2 Judge Bench of:

HON’BLE  MR JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY
HON’BLE  MRS JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA

Issue:

Whether the conviction of the accused under Sections 306 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 can be sustained in a case where the deceased committed suicide due to suspicion of the accused’s extra-marital affair?

Fact

The case involves an appeal by the husband who was acquitted for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but convicted under Sections 498A of the Code, 1860 read with Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 by the Trial Court. The husband’s conviction under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was annulled in appeal. However, the State appealed against the acquittal of the husband for the offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, and in the appeal, he was found guilty of the said offence.

Held 

18. In the instant case, as the evidence would limpidly show, the wife developed a sense of suspicion that her husband was going to the house of Ashwathamma in Village Chelur where he got involved with Deepa, the daughter of Ashwathamma. It has come on record through various witnesses that the people talked in the locality with regard to the involvement of the Appellant with Deepa. It needs to be noted that Deepa, being not able to digest the humiliation, committed suicide. The mother and the brother of Deepa paved the same path. In such a situation, it is extremely difficult to hold that the prosecution has established the charge Under Section 498A and the fact that the said cruelty induced the wife to commit suicide. It is manifest that the wife was guided by the rumour that aggravated her suspicion which has no boundary. The seed of suspicion planted in mind brought the eventual tragedy. But such an event will not constitute the offence or establish the guilt of the accused-Appellant Under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code.
19. Having said that we intend to make it clear that if the husband gets involved in an extra-marital affair that may not in all circumstances invite conviction Under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code but definitely that can be a ground for divorce or other reliefs in a matrimonial dispute under other enactments. And we so clarify.
20. Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The conviction Under Sections 306 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is set aside. The Appellant be set at liberty unless his detention is required in connection with any other case.

In this case, the court examined the charge of cruelty and abetment of suicide against the appellant under Section 498A and Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, respectively. The wife suspected that her husband was involved with another woman, which led her to commit suicide. However, the court held that the prosecution had not established the charges against the appellant as it was based on rumors and suspicions, which cannot be considered as evidence. The court further clarified that involvement in an extramarital affair may not always invite conviction under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code but can be a ground for divorce or other reliefs in a matrimonial dispute under other enactments. Finally, the court set aside the conviction and ordered the release of the appellant unless his detention was required in connection with any other case.